Earlier this year, I saw some screenshots of the Zunker bot and its controlling interface. I became curious about the existence of other similar interfaces and began paying a bit more attention to the spam coming into my inbox on a personal account. After a few weeks of wandering through IP blocks referenced by the spam, I ran across an open directory containing a few screen shots of what looked like another interface actively spamming multiple products.The following screen shot shows a statistics screen for a botnet they are currently using. Similar to the Zunker interface, this interface also has the ability to group by country. It looks like the feature is broken though, as you can only see one bot, which is originating from Poland. Given that, it is tempting to presume the owner is Polish; however, the interface’s text is entirely in English and the screen shot was found on a Russian server. It could, however, mean that the person leasing this interface is controlling it from a machine in Poland, but this is just an assumption.
Efficient Spamming?
The following screen shot displays the different types of configurations currently active on this interface. It clearly shows how the spam Sinstances are managed. As the picture indicates, they are actively spamming pharmaceuticals, watches, and OEM in parallel. It’s amusing how they try to capitalize on their investment.
Creating a spam instance
The following screenshot indicates how they configure their spam instances. (If only they had a larger resolution!) In short, the options found on the picture indicate the following:license.server, port and key are issued to the person leasing the framework;
log_file and the subsequent five lines are debugging options;
mysql.* is obviously the sql server they use;
listen.ip and port is where data gets pushed from the license server regarding their statistics; and,
access.list is presumably a list of IP addresses that are allowed to connect to the Web interface.Options found in File 2 look incomplete, but presumably feed options to the utility used to create the email they will ultimately spam. There is not enough information on the other two boxes to deduce any meaningful information.
So, do we currently underestimate the development efforts put forth by malware authors? I’d say so, it takes quite a bit of time to develop a framework from scratch for this specific purpose and the funding has to be coming from somewhere. The number of active bots is relatively low, but a total of a quarter million inactive bots is still a worrisome number of compromised machines. I find this type of information fascinating and hope to find more to keep posting cool images of the control interfaces malware authors use for their large-scale networks.
Read More… (From Security Response Weblog)